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Introduction 
The trajectory of West Bengal’s power sector since 2000 has been one of the most distinctive 
and periodically encouraging of any Indian state.i Dismissing New Delhi’s prescriptions for 
power sector liberalization with the line ‘one size does not fit all’,ii in 2005 the coal-rich 
eastern state embarked upon its own mode of power reforms based on continued but 
reformed state ownership. Driven by senior bureaucrats within the energy department and the 
public utility, this technocratic model focused on improved corporate governance and 
accountability. Rather than attempting to create an arm’s-length relationship between utilities 
and the government through competition or a grafted-on regulator, the reformers hoped to 
strengthen the utility internally, thereby providing solid foundations for its autonomy.  
Between 2006 and 2011 this model proved strikingly successful. Tariffs were consistently 
revised, rural electrification accelerated, albeit from a low base, and aggregate technical and 
commercial (AT&C) losses dropped (Figure 2). By 2011 West Bengal had become one of 
only three states with profitable utilities, topping performance indices.iii Yet the sector has 
subsequently become more troubled. Tariff revisions have failed to keep pace with rising 
costs,iv AT&C losses are escalating once more, and the quality and morale of personnel 
appears to have declinedv—although West Bengal continues to outperform many other states. 
What explains this reform trajectory? First, why were power reforms successfully initiated? 
While West Bengal did not have to contend with powerful farmer lobbies, it was a densely 
populated, nominally communist state with a long history of union activism and popular 
protest, an unusually high government debt burden, and flagging industrial development—
hardly an obvious reform pioneer. Second, why did the reforms’ initial performance gains 
start to plateau?  
This chapter argues that West Bengal’s power reform trajectory is inseparable from the state’s 
wider political scenario, especially the degree of party-political competition. Under 
(democratic) one-party dominance, regimes may opt to ‘tie their own hands’ through 
insulated power governance as the electoral and financial gains from insulation are greater in 
the longer term, offering sustained performance and helping to attract lucrative industry.vi 
The Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) governed West Bengal effectively 
unopposed between 1977 and 2011 (Table 2). This gave it the perceived strength to tilt 
towards a long-term strategy that sought to insulate utilities against short-termist political 
interference.  
Under increased political competition, by contrast, regime time horizons are shorter. 
Administrations opt for subsidies that temporarily head off popular resistance at the cost of 
longer-term financial health. While improved electricity supplies were popular, the CPI(M)’s 
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overall prioritization of industry came at the cost of public support. After years of local unrest 
and declining CPI(M) electoral performance from 2008, 2011 saw the first change in 
government in 34 years. Over its first term (2011-16) the new Trinamool Congress regime 
enacted power policy in the shadow of this increased party-political competition, opting for 
the short-term gains from accelerated rural electrification, populist subsidies, and tolerance of 
power theft over long-termist governance. Nonetheless, the internally-focused reform path 
has proven a source of limited but real resilience: the utilities’ new culture and accountability 
mechanisms appear to have survived somewhat intact, and performance remains above pre-
reform levels.  
 
West Bengal’s power experience thus demonstrates, first, that comparatively weak farmer 
lobbies can help to facilitate reform. Second, it suggests the promise and limits of public 
sector reform as an alternative to the model of deregulation and privatization advocated by 
the World Bank in the 1990s and the central government-endorsed Electricity Act of 2003. 
Third, it illustrates the significance of party-political competition and developments in the 
wider economy in shaping and undermining power reforms. The following sections explore 
the prehistory, process, key characteristics, and sustainability of this distinctive model of 
power reform.  
 
Figure 1. Physical and Financial Profile – West Bengal 
 
Sources: CSO. Energy Statistics. New Delhi: Central Statistics office, Ministry of Statistics 
and Programme Implementation, Government of India, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016; PFC. 
Reports on Performance of State Power Utilities. New Delhi: Power Finance Corporation 















Figure 2. Supply-side Costs and Revenue Recovery – West Bengal 
 
Source: PFC. Reports on Performance of State Power Utilities. New Delhi: Power Finance 
Corporation Limited, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2016. 
 
Table 1. Timeline of Key Events – West Bengal 
State politics  Power sector events 
• CPI(M) first elected, beginning 34 
years of one-party rule (Chief Minister: 
Jyoti Basu) 
1977  
   
 1999 • West Bengal Electricity Regulatory 
Commission established 
• Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee becomes 
Chief Minister, accelerating 
liberalization 
2000 • Public sector enterprise reforms 
initiated 
 2001  
 2002 • Anti-power theft law passed 
 2003 • CPI(M) calls for amendments to 
national Electricity Act 
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• Government of West Bengal forms 
committee on power restructuring  
• CPI(M) dominates in Lok Sabha 
elections 
2004  
 2005 • Power reform efforts initiated  
• Centre’s Rajiv Gandhi Grameen 
Vidyutikaran Yojana for rural 
electrification launched  
• CPI(M) reelected for seventh 
consecutive time with enlarged seat 
share 
2006  
• Violence erupts against pro-industry 
projects in Nandigram and Singur 
2007 • Unbundling of WBSEB into 
WBSETCL (transmission) and 
WBSEDCL (distribution) 
• CPI(M) loses many village-level 
elections 
2008 • Performance-based incentive 
scheme and audits introduced in 
utilities 
• CPI(M) loses two-thirds of its seats in 
national elections; Trinamool gains  
2009  
 2010  
• Trinamool Congress wins state election 
(Chief Minister: Mamata Banerjee) 
2011 • Banerjee blocks tariff hikes  
• Deaths discourage crackdown on 
power theft 
 2012 • Tariff freeze leads to financial 
deterioration; government permits 
hikes 
• Publication of renewable energy 
policy 
• Trinamool dominates in local elections 2013  
• Trinamool dominates in national 
elections 
2014 • Tariff revisions delayed 
 2015 • Domestic tariffs go up sharply with 
retrospective effect; sporadic 
protests 
• Trinamool decisively re-elected; 
CPI(M) vote collapses  
2016 • Tariff revisions delayed 
• WBERC debates ending cross-
subsidy payments from industry 
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CPI(M) 
Seat share (%) 49 62 60 21 14 5 9 
Vote share 
(%) 
37 39 37 33 30 23 20 
Trinamool 
Seat share (%) 20 2 10 45 63 81 72 
Vote share 
(%) 
31 21 27 31 39 40 45 
 
Historical background, 1977–2004 
 
Despite inheriting the largest installed generation capacity of any province at independence, 
after 1947 West Bengal electrified slowly. Thanks to the state’s longstanding reputation for 
labour militancy, the lucrative industrial consumer base was slow to grow. The West Bengal 
State Electricity Board (WBSEB) was also structurally deprived of high-paying consumers to 
bolster its revenues for expansion. Kolkata is served by the private Calcutta Electric Supply 
Company (CESC), while the industrial belts around Durgapur and Asansol–Raniganj are 
monopolized by other utilities outside the state government’s control. Rural electrification 
proved especially sluggish, in contrast to western and southern states with wealthy 
agricultural lobbies.vii This urban bias was in part geologically determined—the state’s wet, 
fertile climate meant that irrigation was less of a priority than in drier areas—but it was also 
politically conditioned.  
 
By the mid-1970s West Bengal’s power sector was in a state of crisis, mirroring the state’s 
wider power vacuum. Load shedding extended for up to 12 hours even in Kolkata. A new 
Left Front government, headed by the CPI(M), began a slow stabilization of the sector—
though WBSEB’s financial performance remained among India’s worst until the end of the 
century. The CPI(M) would hold power for the next 34 years, winning seven consecutive 
state elections to become India’s longest-serving state administration (Table 2).  
 
The neglect of rural electrification persisted even under this nominally communist regime, 
despite its loyal rural voter base and famed land reforms. The 2001 census recorded a rural 
household electrification rate of only 20.3 per cent, well below the all-India average of 43.5 
per cent. This neglect suggests the shallowness of the CPI(M)’s pro-poor reforms in practice. 
Its leadership was dominated by urban, educated, upper-caste elites conscious of the 
importance of placating urban constituencies and large industrial houses with adequate 
electricity, even while offering poor voters only modest redistribution.viii Its land reforms also 
helped to prevent the emergence of a wealthy farmer lobby by creating an agrarian class with 
significantly smaller holdings than their counterparts elsewhere, while its powerful party-
state organization in rural areas headed off alternative modes of organization (see below). 
West Bengal thus largely escaped some of the power sector’s canonical problems—notably 
low tariffs for farmers, which elsewhere led to financial debilitation. Agricultural 
consumption currently remains under 10 per cent of total load, and more recently the 
government has enforced agricultural tariff hikes unthinkable in many other states.ix Together 
the CPI(M)’s one-party dominance and the absence of powerful farmer lobbies would 
provide the preconditions for West Bengal’s successful power reforms of the mid-2000s.  
 
Technocratic power reforms, 2005–10  
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In 1991 the Union government began ‘big bang’ liberalization reforms, with power 
generation the first major sector opened to private investment. West Bengal was an unlikely 
liberalizer: its governing elite retained a publicly anti-market ideology, and the stance of its 
administrations to New Delhi has traditionally been oppositional.x Nonetheless, the CPI(M) 
was more pragmatic than dogmatic, and West Bengal’s dire fiscal situation was becoming 
increasingly obvious. In the mid-1990s Chief Minister Jyoti Basu (governed 1977–2000) 
adopted a ‘new’ liberal industrial policy and began to woo private investment. This was 
accelerated by his replacement, the reformist Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee (2000–11), although 
the party’s nominally communist ideology favoured public sector reform over outright 
privatization.  
 
With the need to rein in public expenditure paramount, the crucial precursor to electricity 
reform arrived through the successful divestment of ‘sick’ public sector enterprises (PSEs) 
from 2000. The same personnel—reformist PSE secretary Sunil Mitra and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) consultants—would provide the core personnel for power 
reforms. Several lessons from this earlier experience would be applied, such as the 
importance of financial restructuring and the need to win over employee unions.xi 
 
In these reform efforts the CPI(M) was able to draw on its unique organizational strength and 
the durability of its class coalition, bolstered by a system of local clientelism. Despite never 
winning more than half of all votes (Table 2), its domination was so absolute that West 
Bengal was labelled a ‘party-society’.xii The CPI(M) was a well-disciplined, cadre-based 
organization with a centralized hierarchy vesting substantial power in the Chief Minister, who 
also enjoyed tight links with the senior bureaucracy, fostered in part by the regime’s sheer 
longevity.xiii At the grassroots it combined formal decentralization and local patronage to 
formidable effect, acting as the sole arbiter of local disputes and assimilating social 
organizations such as unions into the party-state matrix. Its success rested on its ability to 
mediate this dual character: the ‘elevated’ domain of centralized, top-down policymaking and 
the ‘embedded’ domain of dispersed clientelism and corporatism, especially among poor rural 
voters.xiv  
 
This combination of centralized decision-making and embeddedness helped to shape a 
distinctive reform trajectory. While the party-state gave the Chief Minister the authority to 
push for major policy change, reformists also argued that it risked hollowing out official 
institutions; grassroots corruption and high-handedness were becoming serious concerns.xv  
This pushed the regime towards policies that aimed to distance utility decision-making from 
everyday political pressures. While these would bring practical gains, the move towards 
apex-led industrial transformation rather than local responsiveness would later come at the 
cost of popular support. 
 
First drafted in 2000, the Electricity Act finally passed into law in 2003. While nationally 
communist parties criticized its vision, the Act opened a window of opportunity, enabling 
reformists to depict changes as externally imposed.xvi In 2005, with the reformers’ credibility 
bolstered by the PSE successes, the Chief Minister shifted Sunil Mitra to the power 
department with a mandate for reform and a strong hand: WBSEB’s performance had already 
begun to improve, bringing with it some fiscal breathing space. While privatization and major 
job losses were ruled out, Mitra’s team otherwise enjoyed wide latitude.xvii  
 
While rejecting the Act’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach thanks to the disasters that had beset 
other Indian states as a result of the World Bank’s 1990s blueprint, West Bengal’s reforms 
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similarly sought to insulate utilities from political influence, albeit in the context of state 
ownership. Indeed, the reforms emerged incrementally from a months-long critique of 
previous failures in other states by PwC consultants with first-hand experience. If the Act’s 
solutions emphasized the discipline imposed by competition and independent regulation, the 
core of West Bengal’s reform model was to empower the utilities and improve accountability 
mechanisms. As a key policymaker explained:  
 
The first step was to isolate the utility—to the extent that the political 
economy allows—from political interference. We never believed the 
government would be out of the sector entirely: that’s too optimistic given that 
the sector is government-owned and fulfils welfare goals. But we could keep it 
slightly at arm’s length. You can only do this if you assure the government that 
the sector will be run well, because politicians have two interests in the sector: 
(1) the quality of service, and (2) the efficiency of the customer interface. If 
you falter in either of these the political executive takes note… In any case, 
both power theft and political interference are often only excuses for 
inefficiency within the utility itself. So our efforts were driven by internal 
reforms. All other desirable ends, like good consumer management, follow 
from this improved accountability system.xviii  
 
The sine qua non was profitability, both to ensure financial independence from the 
government and to reassure politicians that the reforms were worthwhile.  
 
Unbundling was merely a means to this end.xix Informed by other states’ difficulties, the West 
Bengal team determined that multiple distribution companies (discoms) made little sense 
without private competition: it would merely exacerbate regional asymmetries and the 
scarcity of managerial talent. Accordingly, in 2007 WBSEB was split into a transmission 
utility, the West Bengal State Electricity Transmission Company Limited (WBSETCL), and a 
single discom, the West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited 
(WBSEDCL); a separate generation entity had already existed since 1985. 
 
The heart of the reforms was the imitation of private sector best practices in corporate 
governance—in particular, ‘shadow listing’ and the drafting of Articles of Association in 
accordance with the recently-published Clause 49, the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India agreement governing listing on the stock exchange. This aimed to institutionalize an 
arm’s-length relationship with the government, notably through the introduction of genuinely 
independent directors recruited from top-tier executives across India. Behind closed doors 
even the eventual possibility of divestment was discreetly considered, which would have 
reinforced the utilities’ independence from government even while providing a useful source 
of public revenue.xx 
 
If the first phase of reforms emphasized structure and governance, the second focused on the 
workforce. Business operations were scrutinized, while detailed job descriptions were drawn 
up in order to develop clear standards for performance monitoring. The bottom-heavy 
workforce was gradually slimmed down in favour of high-quality technical staff with 
increased wages, and the administrative hierarchy somewhat flattened through street-level 
outsourcing for tasks like bill collection.xxi In this process a long campaign to convince mid-
level employees of the necessity of reform paid dividends by preventing union activism: ‘It 
was difficult for the bottom level of employees, but we understood the rationale,’ explained 
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an engineering union representative; ‘there has been a culture change against the earlier phase 
of resistance.’xxii 
 
Already precociously computerized, WBSEDCL also opted for technology-aided solutions to 
remove or tightly monitor ‘the human element’, taking advantage of central funding for 
automation.xxiii Bulk consumers and urban feeders were equipped with remotely readable 
meters, providing real-time data to improve billing and catch theft, although plans for 
software-aided resource planning began to lag.xxiv Through these measures the reformers 
sought both to shrink the costly bureaucratic apparatus and improve its accountability and 
insulation—albeit at the cost of discreet privatization.xxv  
 
While the 2003 Electricity Act accorded regulators a key role, throughout these reforms the 
West Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission (WBERC, created in 1999) remained 
supportive but secondary. While soliciting WBERC’s seal of approval, reformers remained 
wary of political capture within the system of ‘the regulation of government by 
government’.xxvi Nonetheless, in practice WBERC was often strikingly pro-utility, at least 
while key officials in both institutions were aligned in their technocratic vision for the sector. 
It consistently revised tariffs upwards between 2007 and 2011, and opted for light-touch 
annual balancing of the accounts rather than scrutinizing every utility investment decision 
upfront. Around 2007 WBERC also stopped holding public hearings, which tended to 
degenerate into chaos, instead taking only written submissions.xxvii Surprisingly, some 
consumer groups endorsed this decision, feeling the public understands too little about 
electricity to contribute much except kneejerk resistance to even modest tariff rises.xxviii 
Meanwhile, the utilities enjoy heavy representation on WBERC’s advisory committee. 
 
When the utilities were functioning well, as between 2007 and 2011, this technocratic 
compact with the regulator worked fairly smoothly. When the discom temporarily bore the 
burden of political interference (for example, in postponing tariff petitions) and then later 
sought financial redress via steep tariff hikes, however, WBERC was reluctant to allow it to 
pass on the cost of its inefficiencies to consumers—as seen below in the recent case of 
regulatory assets.  
 
The result of these reform efforts remained conspicuously statist. Today transmission and 
most generation (68 per cent) remains in the hands of the state, as does distribution outside 
Kolkata and the Asansol–Raniganj belt. Open access to the wires by private generators was 
allowed in theory, but not in practice: the utilities have so far successfully lobbied the 
regulator for very high wheeling charges to discourage elite consumer exit, a settlement that 
industrial lobbies generally tolerate. 
 
For several years the West Bengal model proved strikingly successful on several metrics, 
from financial performance to rural electrification. From recording annual losses of US$300 
million in 2002, by 2011 West Bengal had become one of only three states with (marginally) 
profitable discoms, with revenues more than covering the cost of supply (Figure 2). Thanks 
to its corporate governance reforms, the World Bank named West Bengal’s utilities among 
India’s best governed, an exemplar of arm’s-length management despite state ownership.xxix 
Board meetings became multi-hour inquisitions, while automation and improved vigilance 
saw AT&C losses drop dramatically from more than 40 per cent in 2001 to a low of 23.2 per 
cent in 2007-8. In the Government of India’s first formal assessment, WBSEDCL accordingly 
received an ‘A’ grade.xxx 
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As the quality of service began to rise, the goalposts shifted in line with increased consumer 
expectations and sensitivity to even short disruptions; a relatively new 24x7 imaginary has 
swiftly come to dominate in urban areas.xxxi Both WBSEDCL and CESC thus devote 
increasing resources to improving consumer services.xxxii This should not be overstated: in 
many rural areas supply remains uneven, and newly connected households often embrace 
electricity only warily until they assess its financial impact. In such areas slow connections, 
aggressive disconnections, and billing problems continue.xxxiii  
 
Even so, rural electrification has been especially dramatic. Drawing on a heavy central 
subsidy injection, the CPI(M) administration belatedly initiated rapid rural expansion. 
Between the 2001 and 2011 censuses the proportion of rural households using electricity as 
their primary light source doubled from 20.3 to 40.3 per cent, with connections rising from 
3.57 million to 8.57 million. Nonetheless, this came too late to prevent the popular backlash 
against the CPI(M)’s pro-industrial reforms. By 2008 more than half of Bengali villages 
would be in opposition hands, and in the 2009 national elections the party lost two-thirds of 
its Lok Sabha seats (Table 2).  
 
Intensifying party-political competition, 2011–16  
 
The Left Front had banked heavily on the hope that improving the investment climate, 
including through reliable electricity, would bring dividends. Its elitist, technocratic 
governance style may have begun to deliver in the power sector, but the general pro-industry 
tilt came at the cost of the CPI(M)’s overall moral and political credibility. After 34 years in 
control, it lost the elections of May 2011. A post-poll survey of voters suggested that the 
CPI(M) was voted out not because of its governance record, but for betraying its pro-poor 
ideology—most notoriously through coercive state land acquisition at Nandigram and Singur 
in 2007.xxxiv  
 
In its place, the Trinamool Congress swept to a majority (Table 2), winning over much of the 
Left Front’s hitherto resilient base of small cultivators alongside its existing supporters from 
the urban lower-middle classes. Yet the newly competitive political space posed quite 
different challenges. This and its lower-class voter base helped to shape the new 
administration’s populist stance towards the power sector. For much of its first term it 
prioritized pro-poor expansion through channels both formal (accelerated rural 
electrification) and informal (apex-level attempts to reduce tariffs, and the tolerance of theft 
coordinated by local satraps).  
 
Some elements of this populism were desirable: in the five years following 2011, the number 
of electricity connections in the state nearly doubled to 16.37 million. Thanks to heightened 
party-political competition, the government nonetheless remained sensitive to popular 
opinion, especially around elections. Upon taking office new Chief Minister Mamata 
Banerjee felt she had little choice but to block tariff revisions, and WBSEDCL’s finances 
rapidly began to deteriorate.xxxv WBERC similarly delayed releasing the annual tariff order 
due in April 2016, just before the most recent state elections, when the Trinamool Congress 
again emerged with the largest number of seats. Pressure was often indirect: ‘I never received 
a phone call from the chief minister or anything like that,’ explained one former regulator. 
Instead, both WBSEDCL and CESC moderate their tariff petitions before elections.xxxvi The 
hikes that were belatedly permitted could not keep pace with the increasing cost of employee 
salaries, interest payments, or power procurement, as West Bengal found itself locked into 
expensive contracts with central generator NTPC Limited. Belated revisions meant tariffs 
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lurched abruptly upwards, antagonizing consumers already facing some of the country’s 
highest tariffs.  
 
After around 2013, when several reformers had formally exited the sector, the decline of 
governance was exacerbated further by a widely perceived decline in the quality of 
personnel—virtually as a matter of policy in order to make the utilities and regulator more 
tractable.xxxvii WBERC was left with only one member and without a chairman for almost 
two years, though during this time it fought a rear-guard action against institutional decline 
(see below). Several interviewees raised questions about the quality of its new members. 
WBSEDCL also struggled to find second-generation champions to take on the less glamorous 
work of reform sustainability in the face of interference. As a senior bureaucrat declared: 
‘The utilities are not at all independent. We are poking them at least eight times a day, eight 
hours a day!’xxxviii 
 
Moreover, Trinamool is not the disciplined, cadre-based machine that the CPI(M) was, for all 
its flaws. United by opposition to the CPI(M) rather than a coherent platform, and virtually 
‘synonymous with’ Mamata Banerjee, the party is more loosely structured and weakly 
coordinated.xxxix Beyond populism, as one former official explained, ‘there are problems that 
Mamata cannot control: political will won’t stretch downwards to solving problems of 
disconnections or theft’.xl AT&C losses had begun to climb as early as 2009 as the CPI(M)’s 
dominance had begun to wane, and continued to rise under Trinamool (Figure 2); recent 
central reports accordingly criticized WBSEDCL’s declining collection efficiency.xli Many 
interviewees thus now characterize the power sector’s problems as a law-and-order situation. 
 
As a result of these trends, since 2011 WBSEDCL has wrestled with mounting debts, 
increasingly resorting to short-term borrowing to finance even everyday operations.xlii In 
2016 its credit rating was downgraded, the ratings agency citing rising regulatory assets, 
uncertainties around tariff revisions, and high T&D losses.xliii In place of tough political 
choices the administration has opted for optimistic technical fixes like rural feeder 
segregation, though agricultural consumption remains minimal.xliv Technology is still cast as 
a prophylactic against ‘the human element’ at the street level, through smart grid pilots and 
big data analytics to identify theft—no matter that the ‘human element’ of apex-level political 
interference may persist.  
 
Yet signs of reform resilience remain. Not all power bureaucrats have simply bowed to 
political pressure. While the high-calibre first generation of reformers are no longer formally 
connected to the sector, they continue to provide a watchful eye and an unofficial source of 
advice to the struggling second generation.xlv Against the tariff freeze of the Trinamool 
regime’s first months, the old reformers mobilized to intervene via the Chief Minister’s 
trusted lieutenants, warning of imminent power cuts.xlvi As load shedding began to make 
itself felt, Banerjee agreed to tariff revisions and nominally foreswore further political 
interference.xlvii Reformers saw this as a victory for long-term thinking, although it suggests 
that reform sustainability has relied on the personal commitment and authority of individuals 
rather than thoroughgoing institutionalization.  
 
The regulator has also provided a source of modest resistance, despite attempts to degrade its 
operations. WBERC took a stand on the issue of regulatory assets, alleging that WBSEDCL’s 
on-paper profits relied on misclassifying a significant sum that ought not be extracted from 
consumers because it stems from discom inefficiencies. A respected discom board member 
similarly resigned over such creative accounting. Even within the beleaguered discom, the 
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effects of corporatization have continued to resonate with utility staff. Managers still 
envisage their enterprise as ‘a professionally managed organization, not a government entity’, 
even if they remain realistic about the negotiated character of their independence, and new 
staff appear to have internalized reformed professional norms.xlviii  
 
Nor has political interference been as heavy-handed as in some other states. Officials still 
generally serve out their tenures and tariff rises have belatedly occurred. In any case, it is 
possible to overstate the contrast with the CPI(M): power theft was already rising again 
before 2011 (Figure 2) and still remains well below pre-reform levels. West Bengal’s 
deterioration is thus only relative. As one reformer argued: ‘From the outset we always had 
doubts about sustainability. It’s true that the sector is not at the level it rose to, but it is 
considerably better than the level that we started at.’xlix  
 
Structural changes may eventually encourage the Trinamool administration to take up a more 
long-termist approach. The 2016 elections returned it with an even more decisive mandate 
(Table 2), supported by mass defections of CPI(M) local cadres. The decisive confirmation of 
five more years in power and the collapse of the CPI(M) vote may mark at least a temporary 
end to the period of intense party-political competition, thus increasing the leadership’s 
perceived latitude for long-term decision-making. In theory, then, the administration will be 
more likely to move away from dispensing short-term sops and towards a sustained 
development agenda.  
 
There are both electoral and fiscal reasons to believe this might occur. First, Bengali voters 
appear to reward infrastructure provision. A 2016 post-election survey suggested that 
Trinamool won on the back of its perceived dedication to economic development, with voters 
particularly emphasizing discernible improvements in electricity and roads.l This fits with a 
body of political science scholarship which suggests that rising consumer expectations may 
encourage a shift away from short-term clientelism to rewarding more sustained and 
programmatic ‘good governance’—such as ‘24x7’ power over cheap but unreliable supplies.li 
With 100 per cent household electrification imminent, power sector officials widely 
acknowledge that policy objectives must shift from basic provision to quality of supply. 
Efficient management will therefore become a rising priority. 
 
Second, structural factors may once again override party ideology. As for the CPI(M) in the 
early 2000s, the drive for industrialization and private investment has again become 
paramount to provide jobs and, not least, to burnish government revenues in this most debt-
ridden of states. Trinamool has thus rehabilitated the CPI(M)’s old hope: that quality 
electricity can lure in industry and so boost growth. This supports the case for reducing 
political interference in the sector. There is even discussion of dropping electricity cross-
subsidies altogether, although this remains politically unlikely and discom finances continued 
to deteriorate through 2017.lii 
 
Electrifying an industrialized Bengal may be a pipe dream, jn any case. Despite robust 
overall economic growth, the declining industrial share of electricity consumption and 
revenues suggests that improved power supplies have not succeeded in attracting industry 
(Figure 1). Electricity alone cannot provide a silver bullet for West Bengal’s political 
economy; industrialists and others call instead for broader policy shifts, especially on land 
acquisition and other infrastructural bottlenecks.liii Such policy areas have proved far less 
amenable to Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee-style apex-down technocratic solutions. Without such 
lucrative industrial consumers, though, the power sector’s future itself now lies in doubt. As 
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West Bengal’s power reform experience sheds light upon a number of aspects of electricity 
reforms in India. First, it provides lessons about the political preconditions necessary both for 
successful and sustainable institutional change. Comparatively weak farmer lobbies provided 
the precondition for reform. Changing levels of party-political competition and the ensuing 
shifts in policy strategies—and, secondarily, the ruling party’s organizational 
characteristics—have proved instrumental in determining the sector’s trajectory. One-party 
dominance facilitated a technocratic mode of reform, while party-political competition 
shifted the policy onus back towards short-term particularist handouts. Second, West 
Bengal’s power reforms under public ownership provide encouraging signs that public sector 
reform can provide a viable alternative to liberalization—but also show the limits of such an 
isolated ‘island of excellence’ in transforming a state’s economic trajectory.  
 
Until 2011 power policy was shaped under the one-party dominance of the CPI(M), 
unhampered by party-political competition and with opposition from farmers and unions 
largely contained within the CPI(M)’s powerful machinery. The CPI(M) leadership’s 
bureaucratic centralism and industrial vision combined with its rising mistrust of the lower 
party-state to produce a pragmatic but statist effort to depoliticize power. The resulting 
reforms were technocratic and centred on internal governance changes, capacity building, and 
technology-aided process streamlining. While rejecting outright privatization, they 
incorporated some elements of private-style management: corporate governance norms, 
frontline outsourcing, and independent directors and consultants.lv The goal was to foster 
improved accountability and financial and operational independence from the government, 
both at the apex and by ‘reducing the human element’ in day-to-day operations. 
 
However, improved power performance was inseparable from the state’s broader political 
economy. The ‘good governance’ gains from the CPI(M)’s technocratic turn could not 
compensate for the perceived betrayal of its socialist ideology. Upon replacing the CPI(M) in 
2011, the Trinamool Congress inherited a far more obviously competitive political scenario. 
Aiming to retain voters, it therefore shifted power policy in a pro-poor, ‘populist’ direction, 
weakening (though not ending) utility independence. In this way, party-political competition 
and the time horizons of power governance appear inversely related. The technocratic, utility-
centred mode of power reforms proved only somewhat resilient under this renewed political 
pressure, although West Bengal continued to perform better than many of its counterparts. 
Today the sector’s future is precariously balanced. Trinamool’s decisive electoral victory in 
2016 may eventually herald a return to long-termist power policymaking. Yet this study 
suggests that the electric ‘island of excellence’ will continue to be buffeted by wider 
economic and political currents. 
                                                   
i This chapter uses ‘West Bengal’ rather than ‘Bengal’, as at the time of writing the state’s 
name change had not been formally approved. The author is grateful to the 35 individuals 
who gave so generously of their time and insights in July and August 2016, and to the 
Confederation of Indian Industry for permission to observe their 2016 Energy Conclave in 
Kolkata. All the interviews quoted below were carried out by the author on a not-for-
attribution basis. 
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